Introduction
The eficient market hypothesis based primarily on the statistical principle of Bayesian inference has been proved to be only a special-case scenario. The generalized financial market, modeled as a binary, stochastic system capable of attaining one of two possible states 
Bond University
Australia. sbhattac@stafT.bond.edu.au this proves that the generalized financial market cannot possibly get reduced to pure random walk if we do away with the assumption of normality, it does not necessarily rule out the possibility of mean reversion as M itself undergoes transition over time implying a probable re-establishment of the condition {mil = m22,m12 = m z l } at some point of time in the foreseeable future. The temporal drift rate may be viewed as the mean reversion parameter k such that k j M t -t Mt+j. In particular, the options market demonstrates a rather perplexing departure from efficiency. In a Black-Scholes type world, if stock price volatility is known a priori, the option prices are completely determined and any deviations are quickly arbitraged away.
Therefore, statistically significant mispricings in the options market is somewhat unique as the only non-deterministic variable in option pricing theory is volatility. Moreover, given the knowledge of implied volatility on the short-term options, the miscalibration in implied volatility on the longer term options seem odd as the parameters of the process driving volatility over time can simply be estimated by an AR1 model ~7 1 .
Clearly, the process is not quite as straightforward as a simple parameter estimation routine from an autoregressive process. Something does seem to affect the market players' collective pricing of longer term options, which clearly overshadows the straightforward considerations of implied volatility on the shonterm options. One clear reason for inefficiencis to exist is through overreaction of the market players to new information. Some inefficiency however may also be attributed to purely random white noise unrelated to any coherent market information. If the process driving volatility is indeed mean reverting then a low implied volatility on an option with a shorter time to expiration will be indicative of a higher implied volatility on an option with a longer time to expiration. Again, a high implied volatility on an option with a shorter time to expiration will be indicative of a lower implied volatility on an option with a longer time to expiration. However statistical evidence often contradicts this rational expectations hypothesis for the implied volatility term stmcture.
Denoted by ui(t), (where the symbol ' indicates first derivative) the implied volatility at timet of an option expiring at time T is given in a Black-Scholes type world as follows: or equivalently
Here ut evolves according to a continuous-time, firstorder Wiener process as follows:
with 00 4 -Ink, where k is the mean reversion parameter. Viewing this as a mean wverting AR1 process yields the expectation at time t , Et[ut+>] , of the instantaneous volatility at time t + j, in the required form as it appears under the integral sign in (1).
This theorizes that volatility is rationally expected to gravitate geometrically back towards it.s long-term mean level of U M . That is, when instantaneous volatility is above its mean level (ut > u~) , the implied volatility on an option should be decreasing as t -T .
Again, when instantaneous volatility is below the longterm mean, it should be rationally expected to be increasing as t -+ T. That this theorization does not satisfactorily reflect reality is attributable to some kind combined effect of overreaction of the market players to ezcursions in implied volatility of short-tenn options and their corresponding underreaction to the historical propensity of these excursions to be mther short-lived.
Market Players' Behavioral Dynamics Model
Whenever a gmup of people starts acting in unison guided by their hearts rather than their heads, two things are seen to happen. Their individual suggestibilities decrease rapidly while the suggestibility of the group as a whole increases even more rapidly. The 'leader', who may be no more than just the most vociferous agitator, then primarily shapes the groupthink. He ultimately becomes the focus of the group opinion. In any financial market, it is the gurus and the experts who often play this role. The crowd hangs on their every word and makes them the uncontested Oracles of the marketplace.
If figures and formulae continue to speak against the prevailing groupthink, this could result into a mass cognitive dissonance calling for reinforcing self-rationalizations to be strenuously developed to suppress this dissonance. As individual suggestibilities are at a lower level compared to the group suggestibility, these self-rationalizations can actually further fuel the prevailing groupthink. This groupthink can even crystallize into something stronger if there is also a simultaneous vigilance depression effect caused by a tendency to filter out the dissonance-causing information. The non-linear feedback process keeps blowing up the bubble until a critical point is reached and the bubble bursts ending the prevailing groupthink with a recalibration of the position by the experts.
Our proposed model has two distinct components -a linear feedback process containing no looping and a non-linear feedback process fuelled by an unstable rationalization loop. It is due to this loop that perceived true value of an option might he pushed away from its theoretical true value. The market price of an option will follow its perceived tme value rather than its theoretical tme value and hence the inefficiencies arise. This does not mean that the market as a whole has to he inefficient -the market can very well be close to strong efficiency! Only it is the perceived true value that determines the actual price-path meaning that all market information (as well as some of the random white noise) gets automatically anchored to this perceived true value. This would also explain why excursions in short-term implied volatilities tend to dominate the historical considerations of mean reversion -the perceived term structure simply becomes anchored to the prevailing groupthink about the nature of the implied volatility.
Our conceptual model is based on two primary assumptions: 
The Classical Cognitive Dissonance Paradigm
Since Leon Festinger presented it well over four decades ago, cognitive dissonance theory has continued to geuerate a lot of interest as well as controversy [S, 91. This was mainly due to the fact that the theory was originally stated in very generalized, abstract terms. As a consequence, it presented possible areas of application covering a number of psychological issues involving the interaction of cognitive, motivational, and emotional factors. Festinger's dissonance theory began by postulating that pairs of cognitions (elements of knowledge), given that they are relevant to one another, can either be in agreement with each other or otherwise. If they are in agreement they are said to be consonant, otherwise they are termed dissonant. The mental condition that forms out of a pair of dissonant cognitions is what Festinger calls cognitive dissonance.
The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, motivates the person to reduce the dissonance by a process of filtering out information that are likely to increase the dissonance. The greater the degree of the dissonance, the greater is the pressure to reduce dissonance and change a particular cognition.
The likelihood that a particular cognition will change is determined by the resistance to change of the cognition. Again, resistance to change is based on the responsiveness of the cognition to reality and on the extent to which the particular cognition is in line with various other cognitions. Resistance to change of cognition depends on the extent of loss or suffering that must be endured and the satisfaction or pleasure obtained from the behavior [2, 7, 10, 12, 14, 11, IS].
We propose the conjecture that cognitive dissonance is one possible (indeed highly likely) critical behavioral trigger [l] that sets off the rationalization loop and subsequently feeds it.
The autoregressive Coefficients a j ( j = 1,. . . , N ) are fitted by minimizing the mean-squared difference between the modeled time series yn and the observed time series y,,. The minimization process results in a system of linear equations for the coefficients an, known as the Yule-Walker equations. Conceptually, the time series yn is considered to be the output of a discrete linear feedback circuit driven by a noise xn, in which delay loops of lag j have feedback strength a,. For Gaussian signals, an autoregressive model often provides a concise description of the time series y", and calculation of the coefficients aj provides an indirect but highly efficient method of spectral estimation. In a full nonlinear autoregressive model, quadratic (or higher-order) terms are added to the linear autoregressive model. A constant term is also added, to counteract any net offset due to the quadratic terms:
The autoregressive coefficients a, ( j = 0,. . . , N) and b . . The minimization p r e cess also results in a system of linear equations, which are generalizations of the Yde-Walker equations for the linear autoregressive model. Conceptually, the time series yn is considered to be the output of a circuit with nonlinear feedback, driven by a noise 2,. In principle, the coefficients bj,k describes dynamical features that are not evident in the power spectrum or related measures. Although the equations for the autoregressive coefficients a j and b3,k are linear, the estimates of these parameters are often unstable, essentially because a large number of them must be estimated often resulting in significant estimation errors. This means that all linear predictive systems tend to break down once a rationalization loop has been generated. As parameters of the volatility driving process, which are used to extricate the implied volatility on the longer term options from the implied volatility on the short-term In a linear autoregressive model of order R, a time series y,, is modeled as a linear combination of N earlier estimates go 'out of sync' with those predicted by a theoretical pricing model.
Zadeh's argument revisited
In the face of non-linear feedback processes generated by dissonant infomation sources, even mathematically sound rulebased reasoning schemes often tend to break down. As a pertinent illustration, we take Zadeh's argument against the well-known Demp ster's rule (19, '201. We briefly present now the foundations of the DST (Dempster-Shafer Theory) (131. Let 8 = { 6 1 , 0~, . such that Bell(A) = 1 and BelZ(Ae) = 1 -a problem associated with optimal Bayesian information h i o n rule (51. Extending Zadeh's argument to option market anomalies, if we now assume that under conditions of asymmetric market information, two market players with homogeneous ezpectations view implied volatility on the long-term options. One of them sees it as either arising out of (A) current excursion in implied volatiljty on short-term options with probability 0.99 or out of ( C ) random white noise with probability of 0.01. The other sees it as either arising out of (B) historical pattern of implied volatility on short-run options with probability 0.99 or out of (C) random white noise with probability of 0.01. Using Dempster's rule of combination (Q), one The Zadeh illustration originally sought to bring ont the fallacy of automated reasoning based on the Demp ster's rule and showed that some form of the degree of conpict between the sources must be considered before applying the rule. However, in the context of financial markets this assumes a great amount of practical significance in terms of how it might explain some of the recurrent anomalies in rulebased information prccessing by inter-related market players in the face of apparently coficting knowledge sources. The traditional conflict between the fundamental analysts and the technical analysts over the credibility of their respective knowledge sources is of course all too well known! A,BED*,AnB=C
Neutrosophic Reasoning
Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that is concerned with neutralities and their interaction with various ideational spectra. Let T , I , F be real subsets of the non-standard interual 1-0; 1+[. If E > 0 is an infinitesimal such that for all positive integers n and we have le1 < l / n , then the non-standard finite numbers 1+ = 1 + e and 0-= 0 -form the boundaries of the non-standard interval 1-0; 1+[. Statically, T , I , F are subsets while dynamically they may he viewed as set-valued vector functions. If a logical proposition is said to be t% true in T , i% indeterminate in I and f % false in F then T , I , F are referred to as the neutrosophic components. Neutrosophic probability is useful to events that are shrouded in a veil of indeterminacy like the actual implied volatility of long-term options. As this approach uses a subsetapproximation for truth-values, indeterminacy and falsity-values it provides a better approximation than classical probability to uncertain events.
The neutrosophic probability approach also makes a distinction between relative sure event, event that is true only in certain worId(s): NP(rse) = 1, and absolute sun: event, event that is true for all possible world(s): NP(ase) = l+. Similar relations can he drawn for relative impossible euent/absohte impossible event and relative indeterminate euent/ absolute indeterminate event. In case where the truth-and falsity-components are Complimentary i.e. they sum up to unity, and there is no indeterminacy and one is reduced to classical probability. Therefore, neutrcsophic probability may be viewed as a generalization of classical and imprecise probabilities (151.
When a long-term option priced hy the collective action of the market players is observed to be deviating from the theoretical price, three possibilities must he considered (a) The theoretical price is obtained by an inadequate pricing model, which means that the market price may well be the true price, (b) An unstable rationalization loop has taken shape that bas pushed the market price of the option 'out of sync' with its true price, or (c) The nature of the deviation is indeterminate and could be due to either (a) or (h) or a super-position of both (a) and (b) and/or due to some random white noise.
However, it is to he noted that in none of these three possible cases are we referring to the efficiency or otherwise of the market as a whole. The market can only be as eficient as the information it gets to process. Therefore, if the information about the true price of the option is misleading (perhaps due to an inadequate pricing model), the market cannot he expected to process it into something useful -after all, the markets can't be expected to pull jack-rabbits out of empty hats! With T , I , F as the neutrosophic components, let us now define the following events: H = {p : p is the true option price determined hy the theoretical pricing model} (11) and A4 = {p : p is the true option price determined by the prevailing market price} (12)
Then there is a t % chance that the event ( H f l M C ) is true, or corollarily, the complimentary event (HC fl M ) is untrue, there is a f % chance that the event ( M " n H ) is untrue, or corollarily, the complimentary event ( M fl H e ) is true and there is a 2% chance that neither (HflM') nor (MflHC) is true/untrue; i.e. the determinant of the true market price is indeterminate. This would fit in nicely with possibility (c) enumerated above -that the nature of the deviation could be due to either (a) or (b) or a super-position of both (a) and (b) and/or due to some random white noise.
Illustratively, a set of ARl models used to extract the mean reversion parameter driving the volatility process over time have coeficients of determination in the range say between 50%-70%, then we can say that t varies in the set T (50% -70%). If the subjective probability assessments of well-informed market players about the weight of the current excursions in implied volatility on short-term options lie in the range say between 40%-60%, then f varies in the set F (40%-60%). Then unexplained variation in the temporal volatility driving process together with the subjective assessment by the market players will make the event indeterminate by either 30% or 40%. Then the neutrosophic probability of the true price of the option being determined hy the theoretical pricing model is N P ( H fl M C ) = ((50-70), (40-60), {30,40}].
Conclusion
Finally, in terms of our behavioral conceptualization of the market anomaly primarily as manifestation of mass cognitive dissonance, the joint neutrosophic p r o b ability NP(HnM') will also be indicative of the extent to which an unstable rationalization loop has formed out of such mass cognitive dissonance that is causing the market price to deviate from the true price of the option. Obviously increasing strength of the non-linear feedback process fuelling the rationalization loop will tend to increase this deviation. As human psychology; and consequently a lot of subjectivity; is involved in the process of determining what drives the market prices, neutrosophic reasoning will tend to reconcile market information much more realistically than classical probability theory. Neutrosophic reasoning a p Droach will also be an imnrovement over rulebased 
